[C320-list] No Mr. Second Officer, Your Other Left

[Chef Adam Weiner]

John, thanks.

Adam

-----Original Message-----
From: c320-list-bounces at catalina320.com
[mailto:c320-list-bounces at catalina320.com] On Behalf Of John Frost
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2008 3:30 PM
To: 'C320-List'
Subject: [C320-list] No Mr. Second Officer, Your Other Left

In case you were curious what made the cruise ship leaving the Florida coast
suddenly heal 24 degrees at full speed back in '06, see NTSB conclusions
below.  

Luckily, I don't think they were using an ST 4000 autopilot.   :-)

 

John Frost

2007 C320 MKII, Hull # 1118

Lake Guntesville, AL

 

 

************************************************************

                      NTSB PRESS RELEASE

************************************************************

 

National Transportation Safety Board

Washington, DC 20594

 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 10, 2008

SB-08-01

 

************************************************************

CREW MISTAKES CAUSED HEELING OF CROWN PRINCESS CRUISE SHIP

************************************************************

 

        The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the
probable cause of an accident involving the cruise ship Crown Princess was
the second officer's incorrect wheel commands, executed first to counter an
unanticipated high rate of turn and then to counter the vessel's heeling. 

 

        Contributing to the cause of the accident were the captain's and
staff captain's inappropriate inputs to the vessel's integrated navigation
system while it was traveling at high speed in relatively shallow water,
their failure to stabilize the vessel's heading fluctuations before leaving
the bridge, and the inadequate training of crewmembers in the use of
integrated navigation systems.

 

        "We see from this accident the importance of having adequate
training," said NTSB Mark V. Rosenker. "Had the crew been better trained in
the equipment they were using, this accident may not have occurred, and
implementing our recommendations is one way to help ensure this." 

 

        On July 18, 2006, the cruise ship Crown Princess, which had been in
service about a month, departed Port Canaveral, Florida, for Brooklyn, New
York, its last port on a 10-day round trip voyage to the Caribbean. About an
hour after departing, the vessel's automatic navigation system caused the
ship's heading to fluctuate around its intended course. Alarmed by a
perceived high rate of turn, the second officer attempted to take corrective
action that resulted in the ship heeling to a maximum angle of about 24
degrees to starboard. This caused people to be thrown about or struck by
unsecured objects, resulting in 14 serious and 284 minor injuries to
passengers and crewmembers. The vessel incurred no damage to its structure
but sustained considerable damage to unsecured interior components,
cabinets, and their contents. 

 

        The report adopted by the Board today states that the Crown Princess
was operating at nearly full speed when the second officer took the
controls. Because of instabilities in the automatic steering system, the
officer faced the problem of navigating a vessel that exhibited both
increasing course deviations and high rates of turn. The second officer took
manual control of the steering and steered back and forth between port and
starboard in increasingly wider turns. Rather than remedying the problem,
the second officer's actions aggravated the situation, resulting in a very
large angle of heel. The captain quickly returned to the bridge and brought
the vessel under control by centering the rudder and reducing speed. The
Safety Board concluded that the incident occurred because the second officer
initially turned the wheel to port, when he should have turned it to
starboard to counteract the turn.  

 

        The Safety Board also stated that the captain and staff captain made
errors with regard to the ship's integrated navigation system. These errors
included:

 

*               Failure to recognize that the integrated navigation 

system could be unpredictable at high speed in shallow water.

 

*               Failure to recognize that the rudder economy and 

rudder limit settings on the integrated navigation system were inappropriate
for the vessel's speed and operating conditions.

 

The Board concluded that these errors stemmed from inadequate training and
lack of familiarity with the integrated navigation system. 

 

        As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board made
recommendations regarding integrated navigation system training to the U.S.
Coast Guard, the Cruise Lines International Association, and to SAM
Electronics and Sperry Marine, manufacturers of integrated navigation
systems.

 

        A synopsis of the Board's report, including the probable cause and
recommendations, is available on the NTSB's website, www.ntsb.gov, under
"Board Meetings." The Board's full report will be available on the website
in several weeks.

 

Media Contact: Keith Holloway (202) 314-6100 hollowk at ntsb.gov